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CUBA-VENEZUELA: A TRIUMPH OVER SUBVERSION

by

Ronald F. Marryott

/

Submitted to the
Faculty of the School of International Service
of The American University
in Partial Fulfillment of
the Requirements for the Degree
of
MASTER OF ARTS

Signatures of Committee:

Chairman:

Ronald F. Marryott
Harold Evans

Date:

Jan. 21, 1965

Ernest S. Griffith
Dean of the School

Date: 1/26/65

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The American University
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ABSTRACT

of

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ABSTRACT

International Communism has adopted the policy of subversion as the most effective and inexpensive means of winning peoples and territories. In the Western Hemisphere, Fidel Castro's Cuba is the regional center for subversive activity in support of international communism's policy of infiltration and penetration.

This thesis is an exposé of Communist Cuba's role of carrying out international communism's policy of subversion in order to overthrow established governments in Latin America: President Rómulo Betancourt's democratic government in Venezuela was selected as the primary objective of Fidel Castro's effort to promote subversion and hostility throughout the hemisphere.

The discussion focuses first upon the degree of difficulty in confirming a case of subversion. Next the thesis portrays the part Communist Cuba played in promoting subversive activities in Venezuela by supporting a campaign of propaganda, training of Venezuelan terrorists and providing financial and material support to terrorist activities and guerrilla warfare. The final portion of the thesis discusses the importance of the Ninth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs which was charged with the responsibility of considering measures to deal with the

Cuban menace. The conclusions portion of the thesis focuses upon the specific actions taken at the Washington Conference of Foreign Ministers.

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PREFACE

The term subversion comprises all those actions designed to induce or aid the overthrow from the foundation of an existing institution. Subversive methods vary from simple infiltration for subversive purposes to the use of violence and terror.

Communism has discovered that subversion is the most effective means of winning peoples and territories without running the risk of large-scale war. The purpose of communist subversion is to replace the political, economic, and social order existing in a country by a new condition of state that demands the complete physical and moral control of the people.

Today, Fidel Castro's Cuba is the regional center for subversive activity in the Western Hemisphere. This thesis is an exposé of the subversive campaign the Government of Cuba unleashed against the progressive and democratic Government of Venezuela. The discussion relates only one of the numerous attempts of penetration of the Cuban-styled Marxism-Leninism throughout the Americas. This Venezuelan-Cuban study is chosen to illuminate the tactics and operation of the subversive policy of Communist Cuba, because of the extreme violence, intensity, and scope of the entire subversive campaign.

The following pages in no way reflect the views of the military establishment nor the United States Navy of which the author is a member. Sole and full responsibility for the presentation of fact and interpretation contained herein is assumed by this writer.

The author is extremely grateful for the assistance provided by the members of the Legal Department of the Pan American Union and to the personnel of the Columbus Memorial Library of the Pan American Union. Finally, the advice, guidance, and introductions provided by the diplomatic staff at the Venezuelan Embassy facilitated and enhanced the research necessary to prepare this thesis adequately.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	PAGE
PREFACE	ii
I. INTRODUCTION	1
II. THE PROBLEM	6
III. THE HISTORY	20
Encouragement and Support of Subversion	21
Overt Terror and Guerrilla Warfare	32
IV. THE EVIDENCE	48
V. THE TRIAL	55
VI. A TRIUMPH	64
BIBLIOGRAPHY	75

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

On November 29, 1963, the Venezuelan delegate to the Council of the Organization of American States (OAS) requested that body to convoke an immediate meeting of the Organ of Consultation to consider measures that should be taken to deal with the "intervention and aggression by the Government of Cuba affecting the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Venezuela, as well as the operation of its democratic institutions."¹

The discovery of abundant war equipment hidden on the seacoast of Falcón State in northern Venezuela, prompted the Venezuelan delegate to request inter-American action. Shortly after the discovery of the arms shipment, Caracas police seized a number of documents containing detailed plans for the capture of the city of Caracas by the so-called "Armed Forces of National Liberation" (FALN), which sought by terrorist activity to disrupt the coming presidential elections set for December 1, 1963.

A Special Investigating Committee appointed by the Council of the OAS to investigate the accusation of the

¹OAS, Report of the Investigating Committee Appointed by the Council of the Organization of American States (Washington: Pan American Union, February 18, 1964), p. 2.

Venezuelan Government concluded on February 19, 1964, that the Government of Cuba had in fact committed acts of intervention and aggression against the territorial integrity, the political sovereignty, and the stability of the democratic institutions of Venezuela. Under the terms of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Ric Treaty) definitive action, including use of armed force may be undertaken as sanctions against an aggressor nation to maintain the peace and security of the Americas.

This present "crisis" provides an excellent example of the specific problem the OAS cannot evade if it is to fulfill its numerous pledges to support democratic principles and to maintain the peace and security of the continent. The "problem" of Cuba thus continues to be a recurring one for the inter-American system since the Cuban revolution in 1959.

The present Government of Cuba, which has officially identified itself as a Marxist-Leninist government, has carried on, supported, and directed a policy of subversion in the hemisphere in line with international communism's policy of penetration. It was agreed by almost all of the American foreign ministers at Punta del Este in January, 1962, that the existence of a Marxist-Leninist government in Cuba, publicly aligned with the doctrine and foreign policy of the communist powers, was incompatible with the principles

and objectives of the inter-American system. After expelling Cuba from the inter-American system, the OAS resolved to keep the threat of communist subversion under surveillance. With the acts of intervention and aggression denounced by Venezuela, it is evident that in spite of the many called-for measures of surveillance and vigilance, the danger of the spread of the totalitarian ideology in the hemisphere is now greater than ever.

The challenge with which the regional organisation has been confronted by this present crisis is a crucial hemispheric test of the cooperation and determination of its members. If the OAS is to justify its continued existence, it must defend its avowed ideals and principles. The records of the organisation are full of unfulfilled recommendations and proposals of numerous conferences, councils, and commissions.

Although the formal charge against the present Government of Cuba as denounced by the Venezuelan Government focuses on the specific and proven act of illegal introduction of Cuban arms for use by pro-Communist guerrillas and terrorists in Venezuela, the actual issue at stake is the much-feared subversion by Marxist-Leninist Cuba throughout the hemisphere. With the evidence gathered, the time could not be better for removing previous doubts among the American republics that corrective action is needed to thwart the

threat of Communist subversion and penetration from the island of Cuba.

The purpose of this study is to explore the specific issues involved in this particular case of aggression, to illuminate the role of the Cuban Government in supporting a policy of subversion in Venezuela, and finally, to relate and evaluate the results of the "Cuban-Venezuelan trial" conducted by the inter-American security system. Chapter II of the discussion calls the reader's attention to the scope of the problem and to the difficulty encountered in trying to "fix" the blame in a case of subversion. Discussion of the problem also highlights significant conferences, resolutions, and actions taken within the inter-American system that have dealt with the international communist movement. The importance of Venezuela in the Cuban policy of penetration is also discussed in this section.

Chapters III and IV discuss the series of acts of aggression and intervention as described by newspaper articles, reports of investigating committees, and documented evidence. "The History," Chapter III, attempts to assemble the myriad of facts and accounts which constitute the overall plan of the pro-Castro forces to overthrow the Government of Venezuela. This chapter focuses first upon the campaign of propaganda, training of Venezuelan revolutionaries, and providing of subversive funds to support subversive

activities, and secondly upon the course of terrorism and guerrilla warfare undertaken by pro-Castro forces in Venezuela. Chapter IV relates the culmination of the subversive activities which enabled the Government of Venezuela to request the convocation of the Organ of Consultation.

Chapter V discusses the Ninth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, while Chapter VI serves as the "Conclusions" Chapter. "The Trial," Chapter V, again emphasizes the importance of the "crisis," portrays the basic views of the member nations, and finally, narrates the results or Final Act of the Meeting of Consultation. The "Conclusions" Chapter attempts to summarize the message of the entire discussion, and then turns to the significance of the Final Act of the Ninth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs.

CHAPTER II

THE PROBLEM

The collective security system of the inter-American system seeks to preserve the peace of the Americas by guaranteeing and protecting the sovereignty and independence of the American states against intervention and aggression by any other nation. The OAS has been signally successful in reducing, and in some cases, quelling intracontinental attempts at fomenting or aiding revolutionary overthrow by one American government against another.

The international communist movement introduced in the Western Hemisphere, not only a non-American intervention into the Americas, but also the deceitful and treacherous element of internal subversion. The subversion and seditious activities of the international communist movement was of relatively little importance to the American republics until 1954, when the Government of Guatemala experienced severe indications of communist infiltration.

Within just five years, the inter-American system was presented an even greater menace with the assumption of power in Cuba by Fidel Castro. Since his open proclamation that "he was and always had been a dedicated Marxist-

Leninist,"¹ Premier Castro has sought to export his revolution to the other Latin American nations by means of subversion and indirect aggression. Despite the many called-for measures of surveillance and vigilance designed to reduce the threat of communist subversion, despite the open flaunting of the rules of conduct of the inter-American system, despite the unanimous expressions that the existence of a Marxist-Leninist regime in Cuba, publicly aligned with the doctrine and foreign policy of the communist powers, was incompatible with the principles of the inter-American system, effective action to isolate and hopefully put an end to the communist movement in this hemisphere has not been manifested by the American republics.

This chapter briefly discusses the difficulty in obtaining the necessary evidence to prove a case of subversion against an aggressor. The discussion then focuses upon the resolutions and declarations that the inter-American system has proclaimed and proposed in an attempt to abate the threat of the international communist movement. Finally, this chapter emphasizes the importance of Venezuela in Cuba's policy of subversion and penetration.

Internal subversion, and particularly internal

¹Ann V. W. Thomas and A. J. Thomas, Jr., The Organization of American States (Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1953), p. 360.

subversion as practiced by the international communist movement, is one of the most difficult acts of intervention and aggression to combat. Unlike direct aggression manifested in the form of armed attack or some other such military adventure, internal subversion is usually clouded and interspersed with strong nationalistic unrest and upheaval. To be sure, internal subversion by the communist movement flourishes best during times of national revolt and disorder.

During such turbid times, it becomes extremely difficult to separate communist subversive agitation and intervention from popular anti-governmental opposition. Only in very few cases can a government obtain the proof necessary to support strongly a claim of internal subversion against another nation or movement.

In the fight against international communism's internal subversion, the American governments have not exhibited the enthusiasm and desire that was manifested during World War II in opposition to Nazi-Fascist subversion. The lack of unanimity, or the lack of cooperation of one or more states can render inoperative the defense against subversion. The interdependence of the system to counteract subversion is dependent upon the weakest link in the chain. If any government fails to wage its own war against subversion, the entire system is weakened and undermined. This lack of unanimous effort, coupled with the lack of seal and

earnestness in the fight, is perhaps one of the reasons for the degree of development of Sino-Soviet and Castro activities in the past few years.

The international communist movement is now capitalizing upon the restless atmosphere of the economic and social revolution existing throughout Latin America today. Communist agents working throughout the Western Hemisphere exploit the legitimate desires of the less-favored sectors of the population in order to achieve their subversive purposes and hide their true intentions. Under the guise of defending popular interests, communist agents receive aid and support from otherwise loyal nationals. Through the people of each country, they hope to undermine the established democratic institutions and extend their political penetrations and aggression. These subversive methods constitute one of the most subtle and dangerous forms of intervention in the internal affairs of other countries.²

As was stated previously, the OAS has been effective in combating direct aggression and intervention. It is in the area of indirect aggression promoted by internal subversion that effective action needs to be taken to stem the rising tide of communist penetration and subversion.

²OAS, Special Consultative Committee on Security, Against the Subversive Action of International Communism: Initial General Report (Washington: Pan American Union, 1962), p. 34.

The lack of effective action against internal subversion by the international communist movement is not due to any lack of awareness of the impending dangers of the communist offensive. On numerous occasions, the regional organization has expressed grave concern regarding international communism's subversive threat. Subversive intervention, which runs the gamut from toleration of rebel activities to official encouragement and instigation and material aid to revolutionary conspirators, has been labeled aggression, and the OAS has endeavored to limit such actions.

The OAS is authorized to take collective enforcement measures under Article 6 of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty) to maintain inter-American peace and security. Article 6 states, in part:

If the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or political independence of any American State should be affected by an aggression which is not an armed attack or by an extra-continental or intra-continental conflict, or by any other fact or situation that might endanger the peace of America, the Organ of Consultation shall meet immediately in order to agree on the measures which must be taken

The portion of the declaration that states any fact or situation which might endanger the peace of the Americas is sufficiently broad to include subversive penetration against an American state. From the text of Article 6, the signatory nations are provided collective security against American and non-American states guilty of aggressive acts,

including subversive intervention, against another American state. Drafted in 1947, the Rio Treaty was made flexible enough to include enforcement procedures when it was determined that international communism was attempting domination or control of the political institutions of an American state.

The threat of subversive action by international communism was presented officially for the first time at the Ninth International Conference of Bogotá in 1948, when the American republics resolved

to condemn the methods of every system tending to suppress political and civil rights and liberties, and in particular the action of international communism or any other totalitarian doctrine.³

The final act of the Bogotá Conference declared:

That by its anti-democratic nature and its interventionist tendency, the political activity of international communism or any other totalitarian doctrine is incompatible with the concept of American freedom, which rests upon two undeniable postulates: the dignity of man as an individual and the sovereignty of the nations as a state.

In the same resolution, the American delegates agreed to adopt necessary measures to prevent actions by foreign governments designed to overthrow American institutions by violence, pressure, subversive propaganda, or any other means.

³OAS, Special Consultative Committee on Security, op. cit., p. 54.

The Fourth Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs in 1951 adopted two resolutions designed to coordinate inter-American efforts in opposition to the subversive activities of international communism. The resulting Declaration of Washington recognized the aggressive activities of international communism and advanced broad policy resolutions to meet the emergency situation of the Korean conflict and the "growing threat of international communism."⁴

The adoption of the Declaration of Solidarity for the Preservation of the Political Integrity of the American States Against the Intervention of International Communism at the Tenth Inter-American Conference in 1954 simply expands on Article 6 of the Rio Treaty. This "Caracas Declaration" affirms that the regional body is permitted to take collective actions against any state of the Americas which comes under domination of the international communist movement. The control of a member state's government by a political system of an extra-continental power would, it was concluded, constitute a threat to the peace of the Americas. The Caracas Resolution, in effect, endorsed collective American counter-intervention in the affairs of an American state to remove a non-American intervention.⁵ The Caracas

⁴Thomas and Thomas, op. cit., p. 84.

⁵Ibid., p. 357.

Resolution, furthermore, establishes in advance that domination or control of an American state by the international communist movement is sufficient criterion for invoking Article 6 of the Treaty of Rio de Janeiro.

After declaring that the subversive offense of communist governments, their agents and the organization which they control, had increased in intensity, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, in addition to expelling Cuba from the inter-American system, resolved to create a committee of experts "to provide advice and recommendations in the field of security against the subversive action of international communism."⁶ This body of security experts, created by the Punta del Este Meeting, is known as the Special Consultative Committee on Security.

The Statutes of the Committee define subversive action of international communism to be

any act of aggression or subversion or other act that may endanger the internal security of the American republics and the political defense of the hemisphere, as well as the preparation of such acts that may arise from the continued intervention of the countries of the Sino-Soviet bloc in this hemisphere.

The statutes further state that advice to the governments of the member states will be provided when the governments or the Council of the OAS request such assistance.

⁶OAS, Special Consultative Committee on Security, Statutes (Washington: Pan American Union, 1963), p. 1.

Thus far most of the work undertaken by the Special Consultative Committee on Security has been provided to the Council of the OAS. The Committee's first report was an "initial general report, with pertinent recommendations regarding measures that should be taken" against the subversive action of international communism. After defining the problem of international communism's offensive and discussing several methods that communism uses to effect its penetration and infiltration, the Committee made several broad recommendations to counteract the subversive action of international communism.

The Committee's next, and most important, report consisted of a study of the transfer of funds to the American republics for subversive purposes, the flow of subversive propaganda, and the utilization of Cuba as a base for subversive training. The Committee was able to declare that complete evidence existed that certified Cuba's role in the transfer of subversive funds, the flow of subversive propaganda, and the training of subversive revolutionaries. The recommendations in this report cautioned that the increasing gravity of the subversive threat of Castro-Communism necessitated immediate individual and collective self-defense by the OAS member nations.

The Special Consultative Committee on Security was created as an advisory group only. Its creation is another

attempt toward combating the subversive threat of the international communist movement in the hemisphere. The Committee now examines and reviews information submitted to the Council of the OAS concerning subversive actions of Cubans and other communist agents. In this manner, the Committee is able to function as a collection center for maintaining evidence for use in current and future cases of subversion.

Since the meeting of Foreign Ministers in Punta del Este, the OAS has been keeping the communist subversive threat under vigilance. In spite of the many called-for measures requesting vigilance and surveillance, it is evident that the danger of the spread of a totalitarian ideology in the hemisphere, imposed by means of force and violence, is now greater than ever. In a special report to the OAS Council, dated February 8, 1963, the Special Consultative Committee on Security concluded that:

Since the time of its Initial General Report, the Committee has observed that the establishment of a beachhead on American territory, achieved by the communist offensive, "poses a threat of the utmost gravity to the security of the hemisphere." The events that have taken place since that time, particularly the military strengthening of Cuba by the Soviet Union, by greatly increasing the capacity of the Cuban government to send arms into neighboring countries and to intensify other subversive activities, render the threat to hemispheric security much more serious, a threat that assumes an urgent character with respect to the security of the countries of the Caribbean region. This has become evident, sometimes in a dramatic manner, in the recent wave of terrorism, sabotage, and other

subversive activities that Castro-communism has unleashed in some of the Latin American countries.⁷

The spread throughout the Latin American countries of the Castro-Communist doctrine, Fidelisme, has increased in intensity since Punta del Este. After the October missile crisis, Cuban spokesmen openly encouraged armed insurrection in Latin America nations. The frequency, intensity, and origin of these provocations were such that the OAS members concluded that the Cuban regime had begun a stepped-up campaign of promoting and encouraging violent subversion in the hemisphere.

The acts of aggression and intervention which the Venezuelan Government accused Cuba of committing are part of a planned offensive aimed at extending the international communist movement in the Americas. In this particular case, the investigating committee appointed to explore the accusations made by the Government of Venezuela, found that the Cuban Government, "a satellite of international communism, has been carrying out a policy of aggression that accentuates the threat to the sovereignty and political independence of the American Republics."⁸

⁷ OAS, Report of the Investigating Committee Appointed by the Council of the Organization of American States, Acting Provisionally as Organ of Consultation (Washington: Pan American Union, 1964), p. 17.

⁸ Ibid., p. 15.

Soon after the Cuban revolution, the Castro regime attached special interest to its rich neighbor to the south, Venezuela. Initially, interested in having Venezuela become an ally to aid in carrying out the aggressive plans of the Castro regime in the hemisphere, Cuban policy shifted to making Venezuela the main objective of Fidelista hostility and subversion. Premier Castro indicated this in speeches as late as September 26, 1963. The Special Committee on Security of the OAS reached the same conclusion in a report issued in June 1963.⁹

For various reasons Venezuela was chosen as the chief target of the Cuban effort to promote subversion and hostility throughout the hemisphere. Castro has reasoned that the success of the Cuban revolution depends on supporting revolutions elsewhere in Latin America. Otherwise, as he has stated, Cuba will become isolated.¹⁰ The Communist spokesman, Blas Roca, in a speech commemorating the fifth anniversary of the fall of Pérez Jiménez, said:

When the people of Venezuela achieve victory, when they gain full independence from imperialism . . . all America will be freed once and for all from the ominous yoke of Yankee imperialism. If their struggle is a help to us today, their victory will be an even greater help. Then we shall no longer be a solitary island in

⁹The New York Times, November 3, 1963.

¹⁰Ibid., Editorial, November 4, 1963.

the Caribbean confronting the Yankee imperialists, but rather we shall have a base of support on the mainland.¹¹

One of the major reasons why Venezuela became the number one objective of Castro's communism is because its oil resources and industrial development make it a rich prize for the Cuban subversive movement. One of the major sources of petroleum and iron ore for the free world, Venezuela for the past quarter century has had one of the most dynamic economies in the world. A transition from an agricultural to an industrial society was accompanied by an ever-increasing national economy. The rich petroleum and iron ore resources in the hands of a pro-Soviet regime would relieve Russia of the tremendous problem of supplying Cuba with urgently needed petroleum, would give Castro the much needed capital to support his subversive activities program, and would be "victory" for Castro's anti-yanqui campaign.

Finally, pro-Castro forces in Venezuela decided to "go for broke" because Venezuela has one of the most progressive, anti-Castro governments in Latin America. Headed by former President Rómulo Betancourt, the Venezuelan Government waged an extensive campaign against the communists within the country. President Betancourt's Democratic Action Party dismissed the communists out of the labor

¹¹OAS, Report of the Investigating Committee, op. cit., p. 20.

unions and the public school systems. In May of 1962, the government officially banned all activities of the Communist Party. And while Venezuela continued to institute basic changes—schools, hospitals, agrarian reform—communism began to lose its popular appeal.

To achieve the objectives sought by Fidel Castro's communist movement, Cuba has employed numerous methods to encourage and support local revolution. The following pages provide an excellent example of the deep devotion of the Fidelista leaders to Fidel Castro and his work, their contempt for democracy, and their hunger for power.

CHAPTER III

THE HISTORY

The primary objective of the pro-Castro revolutionary forces in Venezuela was to create such an uproar and state of unrest that a "popular" revolution led by covert Communists within the disgruntled military would overthrow the constitutional government of Venezuela and set up an old-fashioned dictatorship. This would drive the Venezuelan moderates into the revolutionary camp and provide a rallying point for a "liberating revolution as happened in Cuba."

To gain victory in this grand strategy, the Fidelista groups have resorted basically to two courses of action: (1) encouragement and support of subversion by an intensive propaganda campaign, training of Venezuelan revolutionaries, and providing financial and material support to the terrorist activities, and (2) overt terrorism and guerrilla warfare. The activities undertaken by the revolutionary forces are part of the overall plan designed to facilitate the success of the Castrcites in Venezuela.

The purpose of this chapter is to advertise the complicity of the Cuban Government in the overall policy of supporting subversion in Venezuela. Evidence will be produced that will strongly emphasize the Castro regime's devotion to promoting all aspects of overthrow of the

Betancourt government. An account of the terrorist activity in Venezuela will demonstrate the Fidelista's total moral bankruptcy by attempting to destroy with violence what they could not destroy by other means.

Encouragement and Support of Subversion

Exploiting the desires of democracies to avoid a war of great destructive power, the communist powers find in subversion the least costly way of acquiring peoples and territories. Since the present Government of Cuba has come to power, that country has been converted into a base for the promotion of communist subversion—subversion varying from simple infiltration to violent intervention.

The Inter-American Peace Committee linked the Government of Cuba with the invasions of Panama and Haiti in 1959. The Peace Committee's findings identified those invasions as originating in Cuba and receiving material support from the Cuban revolutionary government. In 1962, the Peace Committee concluded that the Cuban Government had been actively engaged in encouraging and instigating subversion in other American countries. The Inter-American Peace Committee found sufficient evidence to make the following statements:

- a. There exists a constant and systematic activity of radio propaganda through the government transmitters of Cuba, aimed at defaming the governments of the other countries of the hemisphere, discrediting representative democratic institutions, and even inciting violent subversion of legally constituted regimes.

b. Many governments accuse the Government of Cuba of maintaining constant propaganda, by means of pamphlets, newspapers, and other publications. . . .

c. Various governments have reported to this committee that the repeated and numerous trips to Cuba of citizens belonging to communist or extreme leftist political groups have been for the purpose of instructing the said citizens in typical methods of subversive activity.

d. In some countries the intervention and direct participation of Cuban diplomatic agents in their internal affairs has been revealed, which has in many cases caused the declaration of those agents as personae non gratae¹

Communist propaganda constitutes a form of subversive action that is just as dangerous to the internal security of the American nations as any other form of subversion. The propaganda from Cuba is constantly increasing and radiating throughout the Western Hemisphere.² The communist agents use as instruments of dissemination publications, such as newspapers, magazines, books, pamphlets, leaflets, postars, etc.; diplomatic and consular missions; trade and technical assistance missions; and domestic and foreign radio and television broadcasts.

The hostile and systematic propaganda campaign

¹ Inter-American Peace Committee, Report of the Inter-American Peace Committee to the Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs (Washington: Pan American Union, 1967), p. 8.

² OAS, Report Submitted by the Special Committee to Study Resolutions II, I and VII of the Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs (Washington: Pan American Union, 1963), p. 24.

carried on by the Cuban press and radio against the Venezuelan Government was manifested, in part, in the following methods: (1) daily transmissions by Radio Habana praising and stimulating terrorists and guerrilla activity by the so-called "Armed Forces of National Liberation"; (2) regular broadcasts by Radio Habana to leaders of the Venezuelan Communist Party (PCV) and the Revolutionary Leftist Movement (MIR) instructing them to incite the Venezuelan people to rebellion; (3) the broadcasting by Radio Habana of bulletins, harangues, and exhortations to the Venezuelan people by the FALN and the "National Liberation Front"; and (4) daily publications in the Cuban newspapers Noticias de Hoy and Revolución praising and encouraging Venezuelan terrorist groups in their "fight against the tyrannical regime of President Betancourt."³ In Cuba, where a single party government exists, and radio, press, and television releases are controlled by the government, the responsibility for the propaganda campaign against the Government of Venezuela is easily established.

Radio is one of the commonly used means of spreading communist propaganda because it is relatively inexpensive in relation to the number of people it is able to reach. On May 1, 1961, Premier Castro inaugurated "Radio Habana, Cuba,"

³Ibid., p. 23.

with intensive propaganda programs in Spanish, Portuguese, English, and French. Official Havana Radio, with its high-powered transmitters, broadcast for a total of 188 hours a week in 1963 with 60 per cent of the time devoted to programs for Latin America.⁴ In 1963, more and more time was devoted to propaganda programs, where broadcast increased to 267 hours a week.⁵

The most severe harangues and incitements originating from Havana Radio was evidenced in Venezuela during the military revolts in Puerto Cabello and Carúpano in May and June of 1962, and during the October missile crisis of the same year.

The uprisings at Puerto Cabello and Carúpano both were incited from Cuba to spread further the rebellion in Venezuela.⁶ During the missile crisis, Radio Habana sent out a frantic signal to all Fidelista-Communist agents in Latin America to step up their campaign of subversive agitation. "This is a call to terror. Attack U.S. citizens and their properties. Show the people's will," signaled the coded

⁴David D. Burks, "Cuba Under Castro," Headline Series, No. 165 (New York: Foreign Policy Association, June 1964), p. 42.

⁵OAS, Report Submitted . . . , op. cit., p. 20.

⁶Tape recordings of the Cuban call for action were made by Venezuelan authorities.

message.⁷ Within hours of the call to violence, monitored both in Venezuela and the United States, terrorists destroyed four oil company power stations at Lake Maracaibo, paralyzing a considerable portion of Venezuela's oil production.

During the "Weeks of Solidarity with the Venezuelan Revolution" held in Cuba in 1962 and 1963, Venezuelan leaders of the Communist Party (PCV) and the Revolutionary Movement of the Left (MIR), as well as high Cuban Government officials, delivered speeches confirming their support for the "Venezuelan revolution." Those speeches were transmitted by radio to Venezuela and published in Cuban newspapers and periodicals. Statements such as "Revolution or Death. In Venezuela we also shall triumph," and "Arise sister country; the final victory is ours," were broadcast and printed during the week of demonstrations.⁸

Broadcasting speeches made by Venezuelan communists and Cuban officials, the Havana radio waged a tireless campaign of scurrility, vilification, and name calling in its attack on the Betancourt government. Referring to the Venezuelan President as a "Yankee Lackey" and his government

⁷Richard Armstrong, "How the Communists Plan to Win Latin America," The Saturday Evening Post, June 27, 1963, p. 22.

⁸Revolución [Havana], November 21, 1962.

as "oppressive, tyrannical and imperialistic,"⁹ Radio Habana encouraged the Venezuelan patriots to join in the fight for freedom. Venezuelan exiles told of the battle for liberty by the Venezuelan people, of the spilled blood of the young people, of the agreement of the Venezuelan masses with the doctrines of Fidel Castro, and of the guerrilla fighters in the mountains defending the people's liberty.¹⁰

Cuban Government officials joined in the propaganda attacks against President Betancourt's administration. In a speech made before a Congress of Latin American Students in Havana on July 26, 1960, Major Ernesto "Che" Guevara called President Betancourt "a prisoner of a regime that calls itself democratic," and said that the Venezuelan people would not "remain prisoners very long." Guevara said, "Cuba would teach Venezuela about revolutions."¹¹ Cuban Communist leader Blas Roca once said that the Venezuelan rebels were not alone, and "we will continue giving them our backing every day."¹²

The Government of Venezuela has confiscated abundant written propaganda consisting of books, pamphlets, magazines,

⁹ Quotes from several issues of Revolución and Noticias de Hoy [Havana].

¹⁰ Revolución, November 19, 1962.

¹¹ The New York Times, July 31, 1960.

¹² Quoted in Deadline Data on World Affairs, "Venezuela: Democracy Under Fire," On Record, Vol. I, No. 9, p. 33.

newspapers, and other materials of a subversive nature published in Cuba.¹³ These materials were taken, for the most part, from persons associated with terrorist or guerrilla groups or from persons arriving in Venezuela from Cuba. Typical of the material confiscated is Che Guevara's, Mao-Tse-Tung's, and General Alberto Bayo's books on guerrilla warfare. The Cuban news service Prensa Latina supplied daily copies of Revolución and Noticias de Hoy for dissemination to the masses of the people.

The major method of introducing these Cuban-originated publications was upon the person of travelers under the protection of official or diplomatic passports. Members of the PCV and the MIR who served on the Chamber of Deputies of Venezuela, and who traveled under diplomatic immunity, had made frequent trips to Havana for the dual purpose of carrying subversive literature and propaganda published in Cuba into the country, and carrying funds for the support of terrorist activities.¹⁴

Late in 1963, the Venezuelan Government withdrew the parliamentary immunity of Congressmen who were members of

¹³OAS, Report of the Investigating Committee Appointed by the Council of the Organization of American States, Acting Provisionally as Organ of Consultation (Washington: Pan American Union, February 18, 1964), p. 23.

¹⁴Ibid.

the Communist Party or its ally, the Movement of the Revolutionary Left. In a statement defending its action, the government said that it could no longer tolerate the perversion of the principle of parliamentary immunity.¹⁵ Just prior to this suspension of protection from arrest by the constitution, two Venezuelan senators were apprehended by Colombian police for illegal possession of propaganda packets of the National Liberation Front, the political arm of the FALN.¹⁶ The Cuban newspapers Revolución and Noticias de Hoy printed daily accounts of the terrorist activity of the FALN and addressed the articles in such a way as to praise the terrorists and defame the Betancourt government. Articles entitled, "Repression in Caracas" told of the reign of terror instigated against the people of Venezuela by the armed forces and Betancourt's police force, the DIGEPOL. Revolución, on July 31, 1963, reported that governmental violence had become so great that "members of the AD [Betancourt's Democratic Action Party] have raised their voices against the crimes and tortures of the political police, DIGEPOL, installed by Betancourt." Both newspapers told of mass arrests and trial by military tribunals of persons accused of being members of the National Liberation Front.

¹⁵ The London Times, October 2, 1963.

¹⁶ Revolución, August 19, 1963.

An almost blow-by-blow account of terrorist activity by the FALN was aimed at creating serious doubts in the minds of both Venezuelans and the rest of the world about President Betancourt's ability to run the country. Under headlines such as "Actions of Venezuelan Patriots" the Cuban press related how stand-out tactics of the FALN poked fun at the intense police vigilance of the Betancourt regime.¹⁷

Perhaps more potentially dangerous, the creation and maintenance of a communist government in Cuba creates a center within the hemisphere for training young Latin American agents not only in the Marxist-Leninist ideology and propaganda techniques, but in the use of arms and explosives, sabotage and guerrilla warfare. The training centers already established, a fellowship program which has granted one thousand fellowships for student training, and a corps of instructors made up of Cubans and other communist persons help keep this training center program active.¹⁸

The Government of Cuba has also established organizations whose purpose is to carry subversion to the American

¹⁷ Ibid., August 21, 1963.

¹⁸ OAS, Special Consultative Committee on Security, Paper Prepared at the Request of the Council Committee Entrusted with the Study of the Transfer of Funds to the American Republics for Subversive Purposes, the Flow of Subversive Propaganda and the Utilization of Cuba as a Base for Training in Subversive Techniques (Washington: Pan American Union, February 8, 1963), p. 44.

countries. Among these organizations are the "Board of Liberation for Central America and the Caribbean" and the "Board of Liberation for South America," whose functions are to plan subversive acts and control sending of agents to their respective regions; the "Latin American Youth Organization," whose principal aim is to organize and train young people in subversive tactics; and the "Free Latin American Association," whose purpose is to place obstacles in the way of trade with the United States while encouraging trade with communist bloc nations. Concomitant with these subversive programs, a series of meetings, conferences, and congresses is held to discuss the plans and objectives of communist subversion. Typical of this type of activity was the "Solidarity with Venezuela Week," held in Havana, November 1962, which called for the overthrow of the Yanqui puppet, Rómulo Betancourt.¹⁹

In September 1961, a Venezuelan citizen, Juan de Dios Marín, arrested upon his return from Cuba, testified to government authorities that an extremist movement known as the "Venezuelan Revolutionary Movement" had been formed in Cuba. This organization consisted of two commands—one already active in Venezuela and the other ready to return shortly to initiate sabotage and terror—designed to overthrow

¹⁹ Noticias de Hoy, November 19-23, 1962.

the democratic government of Venezuela.²⁰ In this same testimony, the apprehended man declared that while in Cuba he had received training in the use of arms and guerrilla warfare. He further testified that numerous Venezuelan members of the Venezuelan Communist Party and the Revolutionary Leftist Movement had received similar training in Cuba.²¹

The Caracas newspaper, Ultimas Noticias, reported that a group of anti-Castro exiles testified that Fabricio Ojeda, a member of the pro-Castro Republican Democratic Union and a Deputy to the National Congress of Venezuela, and Wolfgang Larrázabal, member of the PCV, Deputy to the Assembly of Venezuela, and former Junta President of Venezuela, had both received instructions in guerrilla warfare and acts of sabotage in a Cuban training camp.²² The exiles further testified that the trips were entirely subsidized by the government of Fidel Castro. Larrázabal had been arrested once before on a return trip from Havana when there was found in his possession military clothing and firearms.²³ Ojeda later testified before government authorities that he

²⁰ La Esfera [Caracas], September 8, 1961.

²¹ OAS, Report of the Investigating Committee . . . , op. cit., p. 24.

²² Ultimas Noticias [Caracas], June 27, 1962.

²³ La Religión [Caracas], February 16, 1962.

had made numerous such trips to Cuba and participated in recent guerrilla activities in Venezuela. It is public knowledge that communist and pro-communist groups throughout Latin America are spending large sums of money every year to support their subversive activities. Official sources in the United States estimate the total communist outlay on subversion in Latin America at \$120 million a year.²⁴

The Special Consultative Committee on Security of the OAS in its report of February 8, 1963, concluded that the present government of Cuba is responsible for providing a large portion of the financial support for subversive activities in other American republics. Since the instrument most frequently used to transmit such funds is the communist diplomatic mission, the Committee affirmed that as long as there are relations between Cuba and some of the American republics the transfer of funds for subversive purposes will continue to be difficult to control.

Mention has previously been made of the numerous trips to Cuba by leaders of the MIR and PCV for the purpose of carrying funds for subversive activities as well as receiving instruction in subversive warfare and transferring propaganda material. A Fidelista from Venezuela, who, as a Federal Deputy traveled under parliamentary immunity from

²⁴ Armstrong, op. cit., p. 22.

25 Third.

27 Christian Science Monitor, October 19, 1963.

26 New York Herald Tribune, September 1, 1963.

U.S. "It's daring is notorious."

worthy of a field marshal's staff," claimed the New York
Daily News.²⁷ "The caliber of PAVN's precise circumstantial planning is
not to be denied," it added. "The Cuban Communists are
and communists a striking force on the South American conti-
nent." The leaders are Cuban-trained experts in sabotage,
the "most effective Red guerrilla force in Latin America."²⁶
called Armed Forces of National Liberation, is undoubtedly
two thousand Marxist pro-Castro members—the PAVN, the so-
but deadly. For its size—estimated at four hundred to
the communist terror apparatus in Venezuela is small,

Cheet Geller and Geller's War

the weapon of last resort—terror.

Fidelista resort to the most spectacular communist weapon,
subversion have failed to produce the desired results, the
various phases of political action. When these methods of
policy of the Cuban Government of supporting subversion in
this portion of Chapter III has illustrated the

boiling a suitcase lined with American dollars.²⁵

arrested, stated that he came back from such trips to Cuba

The FALN was formed from a firm alliance in 1960 between the Castroite Left Revolutionary Movement (MIR) and the Venezuelan Communist Party (PCV). Shortly thereafter, in late 1960, the first manifestations of the terrorism that was supported by the previously-described campaign of propaganda, training of terrorist, and sending of funds were evidenced.

The terrorist campaign began with the aim of capturing power. However, after President Betancourt's open stand against Fidel Castro and the expulsion of all Cubans from Venezuela, the terrorist groups attempted, through their terror campaign, to break down peace and order to such an extent that the military would be compelled to take over. The communists could rally the masses against a military dictatorship and seize power through a "popular revolution."

The specific acts of terrorism perpetrated by the terrorist forces are too numerous and involved to list in any chronological portrayal. However, examination of several specific acts of terror, destruction, and crime will aid in illuminating the reign of chaos and uproar caused by these pro-Castro mercenaries in carrying out Fidel Castro's Cuban-style communism.

Tio Fidel's variety of Marxism-Leninism differs from the Soviet model primarily in its espousal of the use of violence by national liberation movements--a doctrine similar

to that of Communist China.²⁸ Cuban policy advocates violence in the cities and guerrilla warfare in the countryside to create the conditions favorable for revolution. Castro's communists believe that popular frontism and infiltration offer little chance of success compared to terrorism and guerrilla warfare.

The Venezuelan terrorists have used numerous techniques in their terror campaign. There is no pattern to their varied and numerous attacks. The FALN and its dedicated followers have executed a series of daylight bank robberies, hijacked a Venezuelan freighter, stolen French impressionist masterpieces on loan to the University of Caracas from the Louvre, kidnapped international personalities, and attacked ruthlessly all forms of United States investments and property in the country.

Venezuela's oil industry, which provides 90 per cent of her foreign exchange and absorbs approximately two and a half billion dollars of United States investment, is particularly vulnerable to sabotage. The country is a network of oil pipelines carrying Venezuela's riches to waiting tankers.

Commencing with the Castro called-for attacks, during the 1962 missile crisis, on the power stations of the United

²⁸Burks, op. cit., p. 27.

States-controlled Creole Petroleum Company's installations at Lake Maracaibo, the FALN carried on a steady campaign of sabotage against American-owned installations. The New York Times reported that in the period from October 1962 to June 1963 "twelve attacks have taken place."²⁹ The Times of September 1, 1963, reported that since the first of the year attacks on United States property alone had added up to almost \$4 million, most of it in bombings of oil pipelines and the burning of warehouses. Almost every month during this period, a bomb exploded and another pipeline burst into flames.

Revolution during the months of July and August 1963 carried the following news releases:

FALN destroys pipeline of Creole in Venezuela: For the third time the FALN destroyed a pipeline of the Creole Petroleum Company . . . [7-29-63]

Patriotas: The FALN dismantled an oil line in Puerto La Cruz—the principal line to the maritime shipping in the Northeast of Venezuela. This was the ninth time that the FALN has dismantled North American enterprises . . . [8-6-63]

FALN guerrillas blew up an oil line of the Texas Petroleum Company—third time the FALN attacked this company . . . [8-24-63]

One of the primary reasons for the intensive sabotage campaign against United States-controlled and joint United States-Venezuelan-owned petroleum companies was to create

²⁹The New York Times, June 30, 1963.

such chaos that American business in Venezuela would become uninsurable causing withdrawal of United States investments. In November 1962, an article in The Washington Post stated that the recent destruction of five American-owned crude oil pipelines in Puerto Cruz brought the total estimated damage to United States-controlled enterprises in Venezuela for the year to nearly \$7 million. This situation would disastrously affect the massive North American investment in Venezuela. This investment was estimated to total \$3,017,000,000 of which \$2,371,000,000 was in oil.³⁰

In January of 1963, members of the Armed Forces of National Liberation stormed a museum in the University of Caracas and confiscated at gun-point five French master-pieces received from the Louvre in Paris. The paintings were later recovered after a gun battle with local police. The captured members of the FALN said they undertook this crime to "dramatize their campaign against the anti-Castro government of President Betancourt."

On February 14, 1963, members of the FALN executed the unusual again when they seized the Venezuelan freighter Anzoátegui after its departure from La Guaira, Venezuela. Three days later the hijacked freighter arrived in Belém, Brazil; the freighter was impounded by Brazilian authorities

³⁰ Ibid.

and the hijackers granted political asylum. A spokesman for the FALN in Caracas announced that the mission was "100 percent successful" in focusing world attention upon the FALN fight against the Betancourt regime.³¹

The campaign of terror that haunted the streets of Caracas from October 1960 until the presidential elections in December 1963 was brutal, recurrent, and affected all phases of the urban populace. In October 1960, government troops were ordered to patrol the streets of Caracas during ten days of sporadic bloody rioting led by communists and the followers of Fidel Castro.³² With the outbreak of rioting again in November, President Betancourt accused the Communist Party and the MIR of trying to establish a regime in Venezuela similar to that in Cuba.³³

The next most desperate attempt to topple the Venezuelan Government by general rioting and disorder occurred as the inter-American Foreign Minister's conference on Cuba opened in Punta del Este in January 1962. The Government of Venezuela moved two thousand troops into Caracas to help restore order. The bombing of the United States Embassy, a gun battle between police and snipers, and continued rioting

³¹ Deadline Data on World Affairs, op. cit., p. 40.

³² U.S. News and World Report, November 14, 1960.

³³ The New York Times, November 29, 1960.

incited by left-wing extremists marked the pre-Castro, anti-American terrorist activities.

The London Observer reporting on the Venezuelan riots gave the following account:

Four days of incessant bombings and gun battles in the streets have killed 30 people, including 7 police, and wounded some 280. Over 800 extremists were arrested during the restoration of order by local forces plus troop reinforcements For the Communists it was a crushing defeat. They lost prestige in failure and outraged the public with the casualties. Many of their most active "combat leaders" are in prison. Police raids on party offices and homes cost them much hard won equipment, including 800 firebombs, 200 grenades and an undisclosed number of automatic weapons. Documents seized are believed to be seriously incriminating - street-fighting manuals from Havana, etc. . . . The outcome has been a definite assertion of Government authority and unequivocal support for President Betancourt by the armed forces.³⁴

During the next year, Venezuelan terrorists stepped up their campaign to force President Betancourt to the point where in desperation he must rule by decree. Beset by extreme rightists, Fidelistas, and communists intent on frightening private capital and hampering constitutional democracy, the Venezuelan President tightened his security measures in an effort to stop the terrorist activities.

In spite of the rigid security and vigilance by the government forces, the terrorism reached wide. The American Chamber of Commerce in Caracas was sprayed with gasoline and

³⁴ The London Observer, January 28, 1962.

set on fire by communist underground terrorists.³⁵ The main Sears, Roebuck warehouse in Caracas was destroyed by fire in February 1962. Shortly after this episode, in his annual address to Congress, President Betancourt delivered a scathing attack against the communists and extremists who had been responsible for twenty separate riots and attempted coups d'état in the past three years.³⁶

In the aftermath of the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962, the FALN stepped up their terrorist campaign to force a military takeover and force the cancellation of the following December's presidential elections. In November 1962, members of the FALN attacked an armored car and stole \$22 million--money to support further terrorist activities. The Sears warehouse again was destroyed by fire and the U.S. Rubber Company warehouse was bombed during February 1963. In June 1963, the FALN terrorists set fire to the United States military mission in Caracas, raided the home of a United States Embassy official, and attempted their third assassination upon Rómulo Betancourt.³⁷ The Venezuelan President then ordered the general round-up of

³⁵ Armstrong, op. cit., p. 22.

³⁶ Deadline Data on World Affairs, op. cit., p. 33.

³⁷ The New York Times, June 13, 1963.

communists who had carried out raids on American and Venezuelan business installation.

Kidnapping was another method resorted to by the FALN in order to create disorder and chaos and embarrassing President Betancourt's government police. In August 1963, FALN terrorists kidnapped from a Caracas hotel an international soccer star, Alfredo di Stefano of the Spanish Real Madrid Team. The DIGEPOL instituted a large-scale search to capture the kidnapper, Maxim Canales, a key member of the FALN and the man who had directed the Anzoátegui hijacking. Canales, in a telephone call to the Caracas press, said that the FALN would continue its fight against the Betancourt regime each day with more force. He emphasized that they (FALN) would be able to stop the "fraudulent elections" in December.³⁸

The FALN did step up their terror campaign with more force. From August to November, the terrorists executed acts of sabotage and destruction with consistent regularity. "Despite almost daily acts of terrorism and a confused political picture, Venezuela's domestic picture continues to brighten," wrote The Washington Post.³⁹

A turning point in terrorist activities came on

³⁸ Revolución, August 25, 1963.

³⁹ The Washington Post, September 15, 1963.

September 1963, when fifteen members of the FALN attacked a picnic train killing five Venezuelan National Guardsmen and wounding several women and children. This attack by the pro-Castro terrorist group led President Betancourt to unleash a violent campaign against the left-wing elements in the country.

The Government arrested principal leaders of the Communist Party and the allied Movement of the Revolutionary Left, and accused them of fomenting recent acts of terrorism. Among those arrested were several members of the Venezuelan Congress including leaders of the Communist Party and several Communist Deputies. The London Times carried the following account:

The Venezuelan Government has withdrawn the parliamentary immunity of 23 Congressmen who are members of the Communist Party or its ally, the Movement of the Revolutionary Left, and ordered their arrest The strong Government action has been provoked by a new wave of terrorist activity in the country; it has evidently broken out with the object of disrupting the presidential elections due to be held on December 1 Both the Communist Party and the Movement of the Revolutionary Left were suspended from political activities last year, but the Government has previously hesitated to move against their congressional representatives because of its determination to abide by the constitution. Members of either congressional House are normally protected from arrest by the constitution, which ruled that they can be arrested only with congressional approval. In a statement defending its action the Government said it could no longer tolerate the perversion of the principle of parliamentary immunity. Señor Manuel Mantilla, the minister of the Interior, said that Congressmen of both parties had openly endorsed sabotage of American and Venezuelan business premises

and oil installations and the assassination of policemen, and had given shelter to terrorists who carried out these acts.⁴⁰

In retaliation, the pro-Castro forces launched a counter-offensive against the government crackdown. Encouraged by Communist Cuba, the Venezuelan underground arm of the communists and admirers of Fidel Castro "intensified its campaign to unseat Rómulo Betancourt or disrupt the Presidential elections scheduled for December 1, 1963."⁴¹

During the month of November 1963, army units and members of the National Guard were called out to battle the terrorists in the streets of Caracas. The terrorist offensive by the pro-communist, pro-Castro PAIN was expected to last straight up to election day.⁴²

The last week before the presidential elections passed in the following manner:

November 25: Terrorists blew up 5 American-owned crude oil pipelines and a natural gas pipeline at Puerto La Cruz about 160 miles east of Caracas.

November 26: Police foil terrorist attempts to assassinate several major political leaders, including two Presidential candidates—Raúl Leoni of Betancourt's Democratic Action Party and Rafael Caldera of the Social Christian Party.

November 27: Terrorists kidnap the deputy chief of the United States military mission to Venezuela, Col. James

⁴⁰ The London Times, October 2, 1963.

⁴¹ The Washington Post, November 20, 1963.

⁴² The Herald Tribune, November 20, 1963.

K. Chenault. The U.S. Embassy is informed by the kid-nappers that they "just want him for propaganda purposes."

November 28: Six armed terrorists hijack a Venezuelan airliner and force the pilot to fly to Port of Spain, Trinidad, after making him circle over Ciudad Bolivar where they throw down leaflets urging Venezuelans not to vote in the December 1 elections.

November 29: FALN terrorists issue a warning that they will shoot anyone found on the streets of Venezuelan cities after midnight, and that the "curfew" will remain in force until December 2 (the day after the elections).⁴³

In defiance of threats and bullets by communist terrorists, voters turned out in record numbers on December 1, 1963, to assure the succession of a new presidential candidate. Approximately 95 per cent of the eligible voters went to the polls despite the terrorist threats to shoot anyone venturing in the streets. The elections were undoubtedly a severe blow to the doctrine of violent revolution. The left-wing revolutionary movement emerged from the elections considerably golpeado, or beaten up. The year-long effort of Fidel Castro and the Fidelistas to destroy Venezuela's democracy by subverting her presidential elections had failed.⁴⁴

Another communist tactic for takeover which is slower but equally violent is guerrilla warfare. This is Fidel Castro's favorite tactic, for it worked brilliantly for him in Cuba. Castro once prophesied in 1960 that he would convert

⁴³ Deadline Data on World Affairs, op. cit., p. 52.

⁴⁴ The New York Times, December 2, 1963.

"the Cordillera of the Andes into the Sierra Maestra of the American continent." The implications were obvious:

Guerrilla warfare took second place to terrorism in Venezuela, but, nevertheless, its violence was felt throughout the countryside by the Betancourt Government. Mention has already been made of the frequent trips of revolutionaries to Cuba for the purpose of receiving courses in sabotage, guerrilla warfare, and propaganda. In one instance, a known Communist member of the Venezuelan Congress was arrested upon his return from Havana when it was discovered he was carrying "military clothing of a foreign army, firearms, gas dischargers, and other illicit objects."⁴⁵ The well-known political leader, Fabrizio Ojeda, testified that he had made numerous such trips to Cuba and participated in the guerrilla activities connected with the revolts at Carúpano and Puerto Cabello.

The guerrilla warfare campaign in the countryside concentrated its efforts on the military installations in addition to supplying some of the terrorist activity associated with the oil pipeline destruction in the countryside. In March 1962, anti-government guerrillas were driven off by government forces in an attack upon Venezuela's largest airbase at Mariscal. In the Venezuelan hills, "youths

⁴⁵ La Religión, February 16, 1962.

equipped with small arms and copies of 'Guerrilla Warfare' by Cuba's Che Guevara," had been carrying out sporadic guerrilla operations and have had to be mopped up by Venezuelan armed forces.⁴⁶

The military revolts at the nation's largest naval bases at Carúpano and Puerto Cabello were declared to be communist-inspired and supported from within by guerrilla forces in the countryside. On one occasion the government used bombers and infantry to fight against "Castro-trained guerrillas" operating in the mountains near the oil rich Lake Maracaibo region.

In guerrilla-infested Falcón State, pro-Castro forces occupied the entire town of Capatarida and captured the local armed forces' garrison, arms, and ammunition. The guerrilla forces "decorated" the walls of the town with revolutionary, communist slogans. Taking full advantage of propaganda gains, pro-communist newspapers reported that the people of Capatarida "received the rebels with great enthusiasm. Many patriots promised to return to the hills with the guerrillas."⁴⁷

The entire Cuban plan of supporting subversive activities by an intensive propaganda campaign, training of

⁴⁶ Christian Science Monitor, April 20, 1962.

⁴⁷ Revolución, July 31, 1963.

Venezuelan revolutionaries, providing funds for subversive activities, and initiating all forms of terrorism and guerrilla warfare "came to a head" in November 1962, when the Venezuelan Government announced it would formally charge Cuba with aggression before the Council of the Organization of American States. Foreign Minister Marcos Falcón-Briceno stated that his government had indisputable proof that a three-ton cache of arms discovered by Venezuelan authorities came from Cuba.

CHAPTER IV

THE EVIDENCE

One of the acts of aggression specifically denounced by the Government of Venezuela was the discovery of a shipment of arms on November 1, 1963, on the northwest coast of the Paraguana Peninsula, Falcón State, Venezuela. The arms cache included eighty-one automatic rifles, thirty-one sub-machine guns, twenty bazookas, five mortars, nine recoilless rifles, twenty-eight bayonets, thirty-nine demolition charges, twenty-eight containers of plastic bombs, and thousands of rounds of ammunition--a total of three tons of war material.¹

Investigation by Venezuelan Army specialists revealed that the arms came from abroad, and that attempts had been made to erase identifying marks and serial numbers. Despite efforts to conceal the identification of the arms, the inspectors were able to verify the serial numbers of the weapons as well as the shield of the Cuban Army inscribed upon the weapons. The Venezuelan Government then asked for an emergency meeting of the OAS Council to act upon the problem of illegal shipment of arms from Cuba to Venezuela.

¹OAS, Report of the Investigating Committee Appointed by the Council of the Organization of American States, Acting Provisionally as Organ of Consultation (Washington: Pan American Union, February 18, 1964), p. 25.

The Venezuelan Government presented to the OAS Council evidence concerning the arms cache discovery and further documentary evidence, found on a terrorist arrested in Caracas, of a Cuban-inspired plot to overthrow the Venezuelan Government by systematic attacks on federal buildings, army barracks, and police stations in Caracas. The Venezuelan Government asserted that the arms buried in the Falcón peninsula were placed there surreptitiously to be utilized in support of this "Operation Caracas" and other subversive activities designed to overthrow the government.

If the charge were true, this would have been the first time that weapons from Cuba had been found in Venezuela, though it is well established that Cuban Premier Fidel Castro has helped train Venezuelan guerrillas.² President Betancourt, commenting on the arms cache discovery stated:

The case of Venezuela is proof that the superabundance of arms in Cuba is not there to repel a supposed aggression but rather to be used to subvert the democratic nations of the Americas We trust that others not convinced that Cuba is a risk to Latin America--especially Caribbean nations--will change their minds now There will not be peace in the hemisphere as long as Fidel Castro exists in Cuba.³

²The Washington Post, November 29, 1963.

³Quoted in Deadline Data on World Affairs, "Venezuela: Democracy Under Fire," On Record (New York: Keynote Publication), Vol. 1, No. 9, p. 57.

The OAS Council voted to investigate Venezuela's charges of arms smuggling and dispatched a five-nation investigating committee to Caracas to study the evidence. The Council of the OAS thus decided to put in motion the machinery of the Rio Treaty to deal with the Venezuelan charges.

The investigating committee appointed by the OAS Council confirmed the findings of the Venezuelan authorities—that the arms cache came from Cuba. Despite efforts to conceal the identification of the arms, the special committee was able to verify that the rifles of the arms cache had been manufactured for the Government of Cuba. Correspondence with the Belgian manufacturer of these arms revealed that the Government of Cuba was the only nation to which arms of those specific characteristics were supplied.⁴

After chemical experimentation on the found sub-machine guns, specialists were able to reveal the coat of arms of Cuba with the words "Ejército de Cuba" inscribed thereon. Other weapons in the arms shipment were identified as having been sold or given to the Government of Cuba by the United States or Belgium. The United States Department of State, on November 29, 1963, declared that "our

⁴OAS, Report of the Investigating Committee . . . , op. cit., p. 27.

technicians confirmed the Venezuelan findings." It gives lie to Castro's repeated protestations that Cuba exports revolution by example only.⁵

To substantiate further that the arms had been sent from Cuba, the Venezuelan Government authorities also discovered, at the location where the illegal shipment was uncovered, an aluminum boat and an outboard motor manufactured by the Outboard Marine Corporation of Canada, Ltd. Through official correspondence with the Government of Canada, the investigating committee was able to verify that the motor had been sent to the National Institute of Agrarian Reform, Havana, Cuba, exactly one month before it was found with the arms cache in Venezuela.

The war material found was hidden in one single shipment, conditioned and prepared for immediate use. The entire cache, determined to be of one origin, was determined to be suitable for use in guerrilla activity.

The military advisers of the investigating committee reached the following conclusions concerning the arms cache discovery:

1. That it came from Cuba.
2. That it was intended for subversive purposes.

⁵Statement by Richard I. Phillips, State Department Press Officer, in The Washington Post, November 30, 1963.

3. That it formed part of a more extensive plan to send arms.⁶

On November 4, 1963, just three days after the discovery of the arms shipments, events seemed to prove that the arms cache was destined for subversive purposes. The Venezuelan citizen Luis Eduardo Sánchez Madero was arrested in Caracas as a known member of the Communist Party of Venezuela who had returned surreptitiously to Caracas from Cuba.

Manuscripts obtained from the apartment of the arrested man linked him to the Cuban-inspired terrorist activity of the PALN. Analysis of the documents revealed a detailed plan for the conduct of subversive operations and sabotage designed to capture the city of Caracas. The plans, many of them handwritten by Sr. Sánchez Madero, contained sketches and reproductions of the main sectors of the city, studies of certain key objectives, instructions for the use of various weapons and explosives, and attacks on military centers, federal buildings, army barracks, and police stations in the city of Caracas.⁷

The "Operation Caracas" or "Caracas Plan" called for the use of armament that coincided with the number and type of war material found in the arms shipment discovered in the

⁶OAS, Report of the Investigating Committee
op. cit., p. 59.

⁷Ibid., p. 30.

Paraguana peninsula. Furthermore, the plan called for use of weapons that had not previously been employed by terrorist groups or guerrilla fighters in Venezuela. As later found out from a Communist arrested in Venezuela, the arms were intended for "Operation Caracas."⁸

Based on the evidence presented by the Government of Venezuela and its own investigation, the Committee appointed by the OAS Council, concluded in its report of February 18, 1964, that the present Government of Cuba had supported a policy of subversion in Venezuela which constituted political aggression. The Committee furthermore stated that the vast material resources of Venezuela, its strategic importance in the hemisphere, and its status as a democratic country prompted Cuba to make Venezuela the primary objective of Fidelista expansion and penetration in the hemisphere.

After declaring that the Government of Cuba had carried out a systematic and hostile propaganda campaign, and had supplied funds and training for subversive movements, the investigating committee concluded that:

1. The policy of aggression on the part of the Government of Cuba was confirmed by the discovery on November 4, 1963, by Venezuelan authorities, of a

⁸Statement by Rómulo Betancourt in Venezuela Up-to-Date, Vol. XI, No. 6, Winter, 1963-1964, p. 5.

plan of operations, the "Caracas Plan," prepared for the subversive action of the so-called "Armed Forces of National Liberation." This plan anticipated the use of arms similar in type and numerical proportion to the shipment of arms mentioned previously. The objective of the plan was to capture the city of Caracas, to prevent the holding of elections on December 1, 1963, and to seize control of the country.

2. Consequently, the acts of intervention that have been outlined, and, in particular, the shipment of arms, constitute a policy of aggression on the part of the present Government of Cuba against the territorial integrity, the political sovereignty, and the stability of the democratic institutions of Venezuela.⁹

⁹OAS, Report of the Investigating Committee . . . , op. cit., p. 37.

CHAPTER V

THE TRIAL

The Ninth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs convened at the headquarters of the Organization of American States, the Pan American Union, in Washington, D. C. on July 21, 1964. The gathered Ministers of Foreign Affairs were charged with the responsibility of considering measures that must be taken to deal with the acts of intervention and aggression on the part of the Cuban Government "affecting the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of Venezuela, as well as the operation of its democratic institutions."

This meeting was the fourth special consultative ministerial conference on the "Cuban problem" since Fidel Castro's July Revolution. Again, as in previous meetings, unanimity in pursuit of the isolation of the Cuban question was only a faint hope and an idealistic expression.

Basically, the hemispheric Foreign Ministers and their governments were known to be split among those who supported the Venezuelan position that imposition of sanctions was the sole recourse to the charges, and among those four nations that still maintained diplomatic relations with Cuba and opposed mandatory sanctions. In addition to the

four—Mexico, Bolivia, Chile, and Uruguay—Argentina had indicated she would not support mandatory sanctions.¹

The "hard line" position (i.e., the mandatory imposition of sanctions) was headed obviously by the Government of Venezuela. President Betancourt asked the hemisphere nations to take "joint, energetic and definite action to isolate and put an end to the communist bridgehead in our continent."² "Venezuela expects all sanctions, except armed force to be applied to Cuba," said President Raúl Leoni in a news interview.³

The Venezuelan resolution to the Meeting of Foreign Ministers urged the application of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, calling for joint action by the other hemispheric nations including collective break of relations, economic blockade and collective armed force if necessary. Specifically, the Venezuelan proposal asked for the following:

1. The first step taken by the American governments should be open condemnation of the Cuban Government. This announced disapproval must be given worldwide dissemination

¹The New York Times, July 20, 1964.

²Statement by Rómulo Betancourt in Venezuela Up-to-Date, Vol. XI, No. 6, Winter, 1963-1964, p. 4.

³The New York Times, July 20, 1964.

and must denounce the Castro regime for violating the ideological and sanctified norms of the inter-American system. This open condemnation of the Cuban regime would have the two-fold purpose of appealing to the force of supranational consensus and chastising the Castro Government for their transgressions before the eyes of the Cuban people.

2. The Foreign Ministers should resort to the Rio Treaty to require the rupture of diplomatic and consular relations by all American nations with the Government of Cuba. This action would be designed to isolate diplomatically the Cuban people from the rest of the hemisphere. Severance of diplomatic relations would also, as discussed previously, curtail the flow of subversive funds and materials originating from Havana.

3. To aid in the curtailment of the movement of funds, materials, and persons of subversive nature, the American nations must engage in a cooperative effort to maintain vigilance along Cuban and American borders to detect any such activity. This could take place in the form of air and maritime surveillance around the island of Cuba, or it could assume the character of national vigilance forces within each individual nation.

4. Isolation of the Cuban island must be accompanied by suspension of trade in all items except for those items of a humanitarian nature, such as medicine and medical

equipment. Even traffic in medical supplies must be accurately and critically regulated. The economic isolation must be complemented by a suspension of commercial air and maritime traffic.

5. Finally, the OAS should grant the American nations the power to employ measures, including the use of force, to counter any future acts of aggression by Cuba against any American nation. Since the use of armed force is authorized under the terms of the right of self-defense, this action by the OAS would be more of an expression or a warning that the American nations are determined to stop the communist menace emanating from Cuba.

The leading proponent of the opposition group to mandatory sanctions appeared to be Mexico, which traditionally bases much of her foreign policy on the principle of non-intervention. While Mexico's opposition to intervention against Cuba had been no secret, Mexico surprised many people by not sending their Secretary for Foreign Relations to the Meeting of Consultation. In diplomatic circles and the Mexico City press, no doubt was left that Mr. Gorostiza (Mexican Foreign Secretary) was "being kept at home as an expression of protest." The influential morning paper Excelsior commented:

The absence of the Secretary of Foreign Relations is an explanation on the part of this country that we

will continue to defend tenaciously the policy of non-intervention.⁴

The Governments of Chile, Bolivia, Uruguay, and Argentina joined Mexico in maintaining a position against mandatory sanctions.

The Mexican Government based its "hands off" position on the conviction that the imposition of sanctions lack foundation, "inasmuch as the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance does not envisage the application of such measures in situations of the kind and nature dealt with by this Meeting of Consultation."⁵ Basically, the Mexican delegation meant that the inviolability and integrity of Venezuelan territory had not been affected in the manner described by Article 6 of the Rio Treaty; i.e., armed force. "We are not confronted by a case of aggression," maintained the Mexican representative.⁶

Although it was genuinely felt that the resolutions proposed by Venezuela would obtain the necessary two-thirds

⁴ The New York Times, July 18, 1964.

⁵ OAS, Ninth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs Serving as Organ of Consultation, Final Act (Washington: Pan American Union, 1964), p. 12.

⁶ OAS, Novena Reunión de Consulta de Ministros de Relaciones Exteriores Para Servir de Órgano de Consulta, Documentos de La Reunión (Washington: Pan American Union, 1964), Doc. 47, p. 2.

majority of thirteen in the conference,⁷ a compromise resolution was produced which, it was felt, would win more of a majority for action against the aggressions of Cuba. The search for unanimity in the proceedings was sought not only to avoid overemphasizing a hemispheric split, but also to avoid future problems arising from probable non-fulfillment of the sanctions ordered by some of the American republics.

The compromise resolution suggested that the breaking of diplomatic relations and suspension of air communications would be merely recommended, not binding, while suspension of trade and sea communications would be mandatory. The resolution as finally presented to the Foreign Ministers also dropped the proposal to suspend airline traffic between the American republics and Cuba. Mexico, the only nation to have air traffic with Havana, maintained that continued airline traffic with Cuba provided an escape for exiles and dissatisfied Cubans.

By a historical coincidence, on the same day that the Cuban Government was celebrating its "July 26 Revolution," the final act of the Ninth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs was signed at the closing session held on July 26, 1964. Based on the report of the Investigating Committee designated by the Council of the OAS,

⁷The New York Times, July 19, 1964.

the Foreign Ministers concluded that the investigation established that

The Republic of Venezuela has been the target of a series of actions sponsored and directed by the Government of Cuba, openly intended to subvert Venezuelan institutions and to overthrow the Democratic Government of Venezuela through terrorism, sabotage, assault, and guerrilla warfare.⁸

After declaring that the acts verified by the Investigating Committee constituted acts of aggression and intervention in the internal affairs of Cuba, the final act condemned emphatically the Cuban Government for its aggression "against the territorial inviolability, the sovereignty, and political independence of Venezuela." In accordance with the provisions of Articles 6 and 8 of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, the following measures were adopted:

- a. That the governments of the American states not maintain diplomatic or consular relations with the Government of Cuba;
- b. That the governments of the American states suspend all their trade, whether direct or indirect, with Cuba, except in foodstuffs, medicines, and medical equipment that may be sent to Cuba for humanitarian reasons; and
- c. That the government of the American states suspend all sea transportation between their countries and Cuba, except for such transportation as may be necessary for reasons of a humanitarian nature.

The Foreign Ministers further resolved:

⁸OAS, Ninth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs . . . , op. cit., p. 5.

To warn the Government of Cuba that if it should persist in carrying out acts that possess characteristics of aggression and intervention against one or more of the member states of the Organization, the member states shall preserve their essential rights as sovereign states by the use of self-defense in either individual or collective form, which could go so far as to resort to armed force, until such time as the Organ of Consultation takes measures to guarantee the peace and security of the hemisphere; and

To urge those states not members of the Organization of American States that are animated by the same ideals as the inter-American system to examine the possibility of effectively demonstrating their solidarity in achieving the purposes of this resolution.

Under the terms of this resolution, the Council of the OAS was authorized to discontinue these sanctions by two-thirds vote at such time as the Government of Cuba ceased to be a threat to the peace and security of the Americas. The Secretary General of the OAS was directed to forward to the Security Council of the United Nations a full report of the measures adopted.

Several other resolutions were adopted at the Ninth Meeting of Consultation, the most important of which was Resolution II, "Declaration to the People of Cuba." In this resolution, the Foreign Ministers expressed their belief that the free peoples of America were in sympathy with the Cuban people in their suffering and were concerned for the fate of the people of Cuba. The resolution went on to state that the free peoples of America express

its firm conviction that the emphatic condemnation of the policy of the present Cuban Government

of aggression and intervention against Venezuela will be taken by the people of Cuba as a renewed stimulus for its hope there will come to prevail in that country a climate of freedom that will offer to man in Cuba a favorable environment for the development of his personality and the realization of his just aspirations.

The Final Act was passed in its entirety by a vote of fifteen in favor of the resolutions, four against the proposals, and no abstentions. However, that portion of the resolution concerning imposition of sanctions received a slightly different balloting. The voting proceeded as follows:

a. Fourteen nations voted that the American states not maintain diplomatic or consular relations; Mexico, Chile, Bolivia, and Uruguay voted negatively; Argentina, abstained.

b. Fourteen nations voted affirmatively for suspension of trade and again the above few voted in a similar manner.

c. Fourteen nations voted to suspend all sea transportation between their countries and Cuba; Mexico, Chile, and Bolivia were opposed to this paragraph while Uruguay and Argentina abstained.⁹

⁹Tabulation of votes made from QAS, Novena Reunión de Consulta de Ministros de Relaciones Exteriores, op. cit., pp. 2 and 3.

CHAPTER VI

A TRIUMPH

This study of the Cuban-Venezuelan confrontation is particularly valuable as an example of the type of problem the inter-American system is required to solve. The effectiveness and flexibility of the inter-American security system is tested and measured by challenges such as this.

The extreme difficulty in combating and stopping internal subversion was highlighted in Chapter II of this report. This perhaps explains why this particular case is the first "trial" of a subversion charge by the collective security system of the hemisphere.

By being the first Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs called to deal with subversive aggression and intervention in the affairs of another state, the conclusions of the meeting and any actions taken were destined to have long-lasting effects on the inter-American system. In this particular case, the frank truth was expressed that unless the inter-American system, represented by the Rio Treaty, is made to work in the face of a verified act of aggression, it will no longer be worth having at all.¹

¹The New York Times, Editorial, July 19, 1964.

The challenge that confronted the Inter-American system, therefore, was one of restoring the unity and solidarity of all its members. If the OAS is to justify its continued existence, it must put into action that which it preaches. Words of Woodrow Wilson proclaimed over a half century ago are appropriate to the dilemma which faced the Ministers of Foreign Affairs:

We must let it be known not only by word but also by deed, that we are the champions of democracy; that we stand today as we have always stood for those basic principles of respect for human rights and dignity on which our country has become great; and that we are prepared to act and collaborate with them in order that these principles may prevail throughout the American community.²

Although the specific act of aggression of which the Government of Cuba was accused was the illegal shipment of arms and munitions for use by the pro-Castro guerrillas and terrorists who were nearing their climax of their effort to unseat the Betancourt regime, this study has exposed more deeply the entire subversive movement in an effort to illuminate Communist Cuba's role in the problem.

Significant and documented information was produced that leaves no doubt that the Castro regime selected Venezuela as its primary objective of a series of actions

²Cited in William Ranger, Pan America in Crisis (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1961), p. 6.

intended to subvert the democratic government of Venezuela and promote Cuba's policy of expansion and ideological penetration in the hemisphere. The vast material resources of Venezuela, its strategic importance in the hemisphere, and its status as a democratic country were factors motivating the Government of Cuba to make use of subversive actions employing force and violence to overthrow Venezuela's Government.³

The discussion of the Castro regime's policy of intervention in Venezuelan affairs through propaganda methods, provision of funds, and training revolutionaries in sabotage and guerrilla operations was undertaken to reveal the complicity of the Cuban Government in the subversive campaign against the Government of Venezuela. In addition to the numerous news articles quoted, the testimony of anti-Castro exiles, and the documentation received from the Venezuelan authorities, the investigating committee appointed by the Council of the OAS concluded that the Government of Cuba had carried out a hostile propaganda campaign through their press and radio sources, supplied funds for support of subversive activities, and provided indoctrination and training

³OAS, Report of the Investigating Committee Appointed by the Council of the Organisation of American States, Acting Provisionally as Organ of Consultation (Washington: Pan American Union, February 18, 1964), p. 35.

in Cuba of Venezuelans in subversive tactics, all for the common purpose of subverting Venezuelan institutions and overthrowing the Government of Venezuela.

The discovery of the three-ton arms cache by the Venezuelan authorities provided the necessary evidence which enabled the American republics to conclude that the Government of Cuba was guilty of intervening by subversion in the internal affairs of another American state. The positive proof that arms originating in Cuba were surreptitiously shipped to Venezuela for use in subversive operations permitted the Foreign Ministers not only to condemn the Castro regime for its specific act of intervention, but also afforded the opportunity to fix the guilt of the Cuban Government to the entire series of terrorism, sabotage, assault, and guerrilla warfare described in Chapter III of this study.

Thus, it seems that the Ninth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs has classified beyond a doubt that "the right of self-defense extends not only to an illegal armed attack, but to other delictual conduct by a state which violates legal rights of another state."⁴ In actuality, this Meeting of Foreign Ministers set a precedent by stating that when indirect aggression, including hostile

⁴ Ann V. W. Thomas and A. J. Thomas, Jr., The Organization of American States (Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1963), p. 352.

propaganda, training of guerrillas, and the supply of funds for subversion, takes place against a state or is used to promote civil strife within a state, the Organ of Consultation is justified in authorizing the "use of self-defense in either individual or collective form, which could go so far as to resort to armed force."

The Ninth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs added up to a crucial test of the resilience of the inter-American security system. The American nations had been sitting idly by, content to permit Cuba to spread its Cuban-styled Marxism-Leninism throughout the hemisphere, as long as the Cuban regime did not engage in open aggression. For if one judges the effectiveness of the regional organization upon the action taken in 1954 when faced with communist intervention in Guatemala, and again in 1961-1962 when faced with clear evidence of the communist subversion of the Cuban revolution against the Batista regime, one could only conclude that the hemispheric battle against the problem of communist subversion was highly uncertain.

Only at the Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs at Punta del Este, in 1962, and during the October missile crisis, had any sort of unanimity for action been evidenced in an effort to "spank" the hemisphere's problem child. The results of this Washington Meeting of Consultation removed a great deal of the

uncertainty from the prospect of effective action through the OAS in the protection of the American nations from the subversive threat of Communist Cuba.

Resolution I adopted by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs set a precedent that could have significant effect on future relations between the American republics and the Government of Fidel Castro. In stating that Cuba's persistence in future aggressive acts would grant the American states the right of self-defense either individually or collectively until the OAS could take effective action, the resolution set the stage for prompt deterrent action. This resolution, in fact, clears the way for use of the combined military might of any or several Latin American nations backed by the awesome sword of the United States. This portion of the resolution is perhaps the key declaration of the entire meeting.

The formal condemnation of the present Government of Cuba for its acts of aggression and intervention was the principal political action manifested. Calling upon the force of supranational consensus, or world public opinion, the main aim of this portion of the Final Act was the isolation of the Castro regime even further as far as the hemisphere was concerned. The political victory obtained in this resolution supported the view that if the inter-American collective security system did not work in this

case, where the alleged acts of subversion had been verified by conclusive proof and testimony, the system would be useless for future such cases.

That this reunion of the Foreign Ministers defined the Cuban interference in Venezuela as "an aggression and an intervention on the part of the Government of Cuba in the internal affairs of Venezuela," is signally important. The Organ of Consultation in this case declared officially for the first time that internal subversion of a member state's government by propaganda and support of subversive activities is an aggression and an intervention. This portion of the Resolution, in essence, supported the United States desire to perpetuate a separate "deterrent" resolution defining guerrilla warfare and other forms of subversion as acts of aggression within the meaning of the Rio Treaty.

All the adopted sanctions add up to little in practical terms. The wording of the proposal for the maintenance of diplomatic or consular relations was changed from "suspended or break" to "should not maintain" said relations with the Government of Cuba. This compromise position of the Resolution will permit those countries unwilling to break diplomatic relations with Cuba unobtrusively and quietly to defy the OAS if they should decide to maintain relations with the Castro regime. Secondly, this change to the original mandatory severance clause of the Resolution

was intended to remove any implication that relations should be cut off within a definite period of time.⁵

The severance of diplomatic and consular relations with Havana was perhaps one of the most important sanctions sought by the "hard line" proponents of enforcement action. Complete severance of diplomatic ties with Cuba by all member states would serve the purpose of restricting the flow of subversive persons, funds, and materials from the island of Cuba to the other American nations. The classified report issued on February 12, 1963, by the Special Consultative Committee on Security stated that until Brazil, Mexico, Chile, Bolivia, and Uruguay broke relations with Cuba, the job of curbing subversive activities originating in Havana would be impossible. The hoped-for unanimity on this point became impossible because of the stand taken by the four nations that have diplomatic relations with Cuba and the refusal of the majority to agree to a recommendation instead of an order.

The suspension of trade, whether direct or indirect, with Cuba, except in foodstuffs, medicines, and medical equipment, will have little practical impact on Cuba. Most of the trade with Cuba by the Latin American nations is in foodstuffs which is not covered by the trade ban. The

⁵The New York Times, Editorial, July 26, 1964.

United States has had a trade embargo imposed on Cuba for sometime now. Chances are the rest of the world will not suspend trade with Cuba as is hoped by the call to the other nations of the world to support the resolutions adopted.⁶

The proposal to cease all transportation between the American republics and Cuba was dropped in favor of a resolution specifying sea transportation only. Mexico, the one nation to have air communication with Havana, was opposed to any resolution suggesting the suspension of air transportation. The compromise resolution requiring suspension of sea transportation was a direct result of Mexico's opposition to the air traffic injunction.

Finally, the proposal which urges all nations of the world to "examine the possibility of effectively demonstrating their solidarity in achieving the purpose of this resolution," will, as previously speculated, have little practical importance. This call is primarily aimed at asking the nations of the world to join in the trade embargo upon the Castro regime. It is increasingly difficult to achieve an efficient embargo upon the island of Cuba when other nations of the world are providing the articles of trade that are being restricted. The main effort of this portion of the

⁶The New York Times, July 22, 1964.

resolution is directed at the further isolation of the Castro regime within the hemisphere and the world.

The results of the Ninth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs must be looked upon as a political victory for the forces of democracy and the principles of the inter-American system. The final act of this meeting signaled a firm position against the forces of subversion and, in particular, Cuban-styled penetration.

The Meeting of Consultation differed from former meetings in that the debate centered upon what sanctions should be imposed, not whether sanctions should be levied. The OAS Ministers were closer to consensus on Cuba than any other time since the October missile crisis in 1962.⁷

The hemisphere still, however, remains divided on the question of Cuba, as this Meeting of Consultation so vividly portrayed. The search for unanimity was sought by the inclusion of the compromise proposal. As the results show, unanimity was not achieved. In this regard, the compromise proposal failed; but if it will avoid the problems arising from probable non-fulfillment of the sanctions called for and prevent the overemphasis of a hemispheric split, then the compromise resolution must be judged successful.

The actions taken at this Ninth Meeting of Consultation

⁷The Washington Post, Editorial, July 26, 1964.

of Ministers of Foreign Affairs will not topple the firmly entrenched Castro regime. They will not cause the economic collapse of the Cuban nation. The sanctions will, however, make things more difficult for Premier Castro and his communist regime. In this respect also, the meeting of Foreign Ministers can be counted as a triumph.

The Secretary of State of the United States, the Honorable Dean Rusk, in an interview after the closing of the conference, said

Castro has no future in Cuba or in this hemisphere. This is evident from the vigor and great clarity of the ministerial action.

In the same interview, Thomas Mann, the United States Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, said

This has been a victory for the inter-American system and a "body blow" to Castro. It proved once again the ability of the Organization of American States to defend itself against aggression.⁸

Armed with the shield of individual or collective self-defense against any future Cuban acts of aggression in the form of subversion, the American nations stand ready to face the threat of internal subversion and communist penetration. The Venezuelan-Cuban confrontation and the decision of the Hemisphere's Foreign Ministers made this defense possible. The American republics have truly experienced a triumph over subversion.

⁸The New York Times, July 27, 1964.

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